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Experiencing malevolent acts is a common feature when conducting business in parts of the 
developing world, but the effects that these acts have on a firm’s stock price have not received 
sufficient attention by the literature. Filling the gap, this thesis looks at the oil industry in Nigeria 
and the effects of multiple malevolent acts over a five year period (ranging from 2006 to 2010) 
on the stock prices of the four major international oil firms operating therein: Shell, Chevron, 
Exxon, and Total. 
The stock price data was presented in the form of abnormal returns, the difference in 
stock price from the expected price. Ordinary least squares regression as well as Wilcoxian sign-
rank techniques were used to test the abnormal returns data for our firms. This data was 
segregated by firm name as well as by event types to isolate the effects that each has on the 
returns of the firms under study. This thesis raises several hypotheses, such as that a negative 
event in general will lead to negative returns and that negative events affecting one firm will lead 
to positive returns for that firm’s competitors. We managed to determine that the only event 
types that had a significant impact on any firm’s returns were kidnappings and government 
policies (either political or economic) targeted to harm the firms.  
We discovered that kidnapping events affected Shell’s returns negatively, whereas they 
have positive impact on the returns of Chevron and Exxon. We postulate that the latter results are 
a reaction to the relatively strong negative effect on Shell’s returns. In response to negative 
government actions, Shell and Total experienced positive returns , we postulate that this is due to 
the market’s perception that these policies will lead to less supply and consequently to higher 
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prices for Nigerian oil. Our results indicate that violent events have no impact, at least on the 
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The effects of malevolent acts on developed economies and on capital markets have been 
extensively studied; however there is a dearth of literature on the effects of malevolent acts in 
developing markets and their effect on developed/developing markets and economies.  Past 
studies analyzed the impact of a war or violent conflict on a countries’ economy (Anderton et al. 
2001; Caplan 2002; Guidolin et al. 2005; Miguel, 2004), others delved into the effects of 
terrorism on capital markets (Chen et al., 2004; Chesney et al., 2010). These studies have 
primarily been very general in scope and usually concentrated on developed countries. 
Meanwhile, some researchers have concentrated their studies on the markets of 
developing/emerging countries (Meznar et al., 1998) as well as on specific industries within 
those countries (Guidolin et al. 2007; Le Billon, 2000). 
 As the above sample can attest studies on the effects of malevolent acts and wars on 
developed markets are extensive, fewer studies exist on the effects of these acts on developing 
markets and their effect on firms in developed markets whom have operations within the 
developing market. Saez et al. (2007) is one study that looks at how shocks (caused by 
malevolent as well as non-malevolent acts) in developing markets are transmitted to developed 
markets. Guidolin (2007) is another study that went into further detail, focusing on the effect of 
events (specifically, a single event, the death of Angolan rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi) on 
diamond firms operating in Angola. 
 This thesis aims to discern how extensively a malevolent act can affect the stock price of 
a firm that is operating within a developing market. For simplicity we focus on only one industry 
within that market and the largest publicly traded firms operating therein. We chose Nigeria’s oil 
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industry as our example and proceeded to collect data about numerous directed malevolent acts 
during a 5 year period ranging from 2006 to 2010. We then studied the effects of these acts on 
the four largest oil companies operating in Nigeria. Nigeria has been a leader in oil exports for 
the past few decades; the country has the tenth largest reserves of oil in the world, accounting for 
3% of world supply. As of 2009, oil revenues are the primary source of income for the Nigerian 
state, representing 95% of Nigerian export income. The entirety of this oil originates in the Niger 
Delta, where Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) such as Shell, Chevron, Exxon Mobil and 
Total SA have significant production operations. Beginning in the mid 90’s oil production has 
decreased significantly as a result of supply shocks caused by malevolent acts, such as armed 
conflict in and around the oil fields and sabotage aimed at oil extraction facilities, refineries and 
the oil pipeline network. It’s estimated that the country lost $33 billion in oil revenues in 2008 
due to malevolent acts of sabotage, terrorism and kidnapping (Davies, 2009). 
Current scholars feel that the cause of this malevolence can be attributed to an increase in 
armed groups of disenfranchised residents of the Niger Delta (Ojakorotu et al., 2010) as well as 
rent seeking Nigerian politicians who attempt to influence the area by arming and sponsoring 
instigators of violence (Akinbobola, 2010). Some researchers, such as Ojakorotu and Gilbert 
point to violent behavior by the Nigerian state in the past two decades against the civilian 
population of the Niger Delta, to date thousands of civilians (including women and children) 
have been killed by the Nigerian military in the region. Others (Epelle, 2010), also point to 
increased environmental degradation caused by the MNOCs operating in the region, as well as 
their subcontractors and the negative effects this has on the secondary agricultural market of the 
region. This coupled with the influx of arms and the poor economic state of much of the civilian 
population has led to the “democratization of the means of violence” in the region (Ojakorotu et 
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al., 2010). The primary antagonist in the region has been credibly identified as the Movement for 
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, MEND, is a well-organized and armed group of militants 
(consisting of militiamen and former soldiers) that operate throughout the Nigerian oil region 
targeting the MNOCs located therein. 
This thesis attempts to quantify the affects that these supply shocks caused by violent 
events, such as attacks on refineries or pipeline sabotage, have on the stock price of a select 
group of MNOCs operating within Nigeria. This thesis also hopes to capture non-supply related 
effects on these MNOC’s returns; this includes kidnappings and non-specific general events, 
usually political, directed at the oil industry. For comparison, events with positive impacts are 
also studied. We first hypothesize that as the MNOC’s primary business rests in oil, ‘negative 
events’, those that decrease any MNOC’s ability to produce oil, shall be perceived negatively by 
the markets and lead to lower returns for that MNOC.  By isolating events into event categories 
we can study the effects of each event type on the MNOCs as a whole as well on each individual 
MNOC, we expect results similar to those obtained by the researchers we referenced earlier,  
such as Guidolin et al. (2007) and Chen et al.(2004). We expect that, in general, negative events 
such as malevolent acts will lead to a drop in returns for the MNOCs. However, the results of our 
regression and sign rank tests are unexpected and interesting; specifically, in regards to the 
effects of kidnap events on each MNOC’s returns. In this case, Shell, experiences negative 
returns directly after a kidnap event, whereas all the other MNOCs experience positive returns.  
We also propose that a negative event affecting one MNOC will be perceived positively 
by the markets in terms of that MNOC’s competitors operating within Nigeria, as those 
competitors now have a temporarily larger share of the market.  We found that this was not the 
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case, violent events, those that damage production capacity, led to positive returns for some 
firms. We postulate that the reason behind this paradoxical result can be attributed to basic 
psychology, in that investors feel that because one facility was attacked, the other facilities are 
safe for now; and to a lesser degree to economics, in that a drop in supply capacity will lead to a 
higher equilibrium price if demand does not change, this in turn leads to higher returns for a firm 
whose primary source of income is the sale of oil. 
Finally, we propose that a negative event or series of such events will lead to positive 
returns for the MNOC’s competitors whom do not operate within Nigeria. Our rationale is 
similar to that mentioned earlier in that a negatively perceived event on one MNOC, or group 
thereof, will raise perception of that or those firm’s competitors. 
We accomplish these studies by normalizing raw stock prices into abnormal returns so 
that only day to day abnormal returns for each MNOC’s stock price are presented. This 
effectively makes the study only about the daily changes in each MNOC’s stock price and 
eliminates the difference in relative value of each MNOC’s stock price. Theoretically, a negative 
event on day 0 (the day of the event occurrence) should lead to a negative/positive abnormal 
return the following day. The abnormal returns are then subjected to parametric testing via 
ordinary least squares regression as well as non-parametric Wilcoxian sign rank tests.  
This thesis aims to increase the current body of knowledge about the effects of events in 
developing markets and their transmission to developed markets. We focus on Nigeria’s oil 
industry because no other researcher has looked at it in the way that we plan to. We hope that our 
findings will help to lead to an answer regarding why violence and strife have persisted in 
Nigeria’s oil region for decades (an occurrence that is rare in other global oil regions).  We 
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determine to what extent a malevolent act or event aimed at a firm (or group of firms) in a 
developing market affects the stock price of that firm (or group of firms) in a developed market. 
For simplicity, the study is focused on a single industry in one country only. From prior studies 
conducted on similar topics, we expect that targeted malevolent acts will lead to lower returns for 
the target. We also expect higher returns for the target’s competitors. 
We used the case of the oil industry in Nigeria, focusing on the four largest oil firms 
(with a presence in developed markets) operating therein. Our results were not as expected; in 
fact we found that some firms obtained higher returns directly after a malevolent event. We 
postulate that the fluctuations caused by these events affect the market for oil in such a way as to 
create higher returns for all involved. This leads us to believe that there is a perverse incentive on 





2. Literature Review 
Scholarly work has been undertaken by other researchers on topics similar to this thesis. Cilliers 
et al. (2000) as well as Le Billon (2000) studied the oil and diamonds industries of Angola; 
however their work was limited in that it did not look at empirics. Saez et al. (2007) looked at 
how extensively emerging market shocks are felt in developed markets. Corrado (2010) provided 
a basis for the event study methods conducted in this thesis, whilst Gardeazabal’s (2010) work 
provided a focus for the methodology. Meanwhile Caplan (2002), Chen et al. (2004), Guidolin et 
al. (2005) and Chesney et al. (2010) provided extensive study on the effects of violence on 
economies and markets. Finally Guidolin et al. (2007), researched the effects of events on a 
specific industry in a specific developed market, in terms of event study methods and thesis 
formulation their work was the most informative. The key results found by other studies on the 
effects of violence, terrorism and/or conflict on asset markets can be found in Table 1. 
 The most pertinent background for examining the Nigerian example is a study of the 
Angolan oil and diamond industries. These studies concentrated on the role of the oil and 
diamond industries within the Angolan economy and their effect on the continuation of the 
decade’s long civil war in that country (Cilliers et al., 2000; Le Billon, 2000). These studies did 
not focus on the effects of events within the market under study or on other markets.  
 In 2007 a Working Paper Series article issued by the European Central Bank, studied the 
effects of emerging market events on the price movement of stock markets (Saez et al., 2007). 
The authors compiled data on hundreds of events in Latin America, Emerging Europe and 
Emerging Asia, and organized these events into economic and political events, as well as into 
positive and negative events. They then applied ordinary least squares regression to study the 
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effects of these events on the stock markets of the developed world as well as on that of the 
emerging world. They found that on average a negative shock event in an emerging market will 
produce a 0.3% change in the stock markets of the developed world a day after the event, a value 
that can rise to 0.5% when accumulated over 5 days. Saez, Fratzscher and Thimann effectively 
proved that it is possible to study the effects of an event in an emerging market on a stock value 
in the developed world, and that results can be achieved from such an endeavor. Their data 
collection, compilation and categorization methods are replicated in this thesis. 
 The initial source of research methodology for this thesis was Corrado (2010), who in his 
paper presented event study methods although they are limited to situations comprising of 
consistent stock price movements for common events in developed markets. Corrado provides an 
econometric framework for studying events, beginning with linear regressions of abnormal 
returns and as to current event study literature by providing methods for determining the level of 
event induced volatility. These methods conclude with a complex methodology for studying the 
effects of events. Unfortunately, as Corrado admits in this paper, these methods are not suitable 
for small populations or where the sample constitutes the entire population; not to mention that 
throughout his paper Corrado refers to commonly occurring events and does not delve into the 
relatively rare and irregular events that under study in this thesis. 
 For a treatise that focuses on conflict, we turned to Gardeazabal (2010). His work 
provides the reader with various methods for measuring the costs of conflict, although we are 
most interested in the section on event studies. Gardeazabal provides a broad range of methods 
for studying the effects of violence on firms and primarily focuses on the economic cost of 
conflict. Most of the methods presented are basic and are tailored to the unit of study (the firm, 
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sector or country) to the unit of output (aggregate output, stock price) and to the data availability 
(cross section, time series, panel). The paper presents cost accounting methods, inference 
methods using cross sectional data as well as time series data. The paper also presents panel data 
methods, natural experiments and comparative case study methods. The section that relates to 
this thesis is the one on event studies. Gardeazabal presents a simple method for determining 
abnormal returns from stock prices and creating cumulative abnormal returns from this. Simple 
regression analysis is then conducted to determine the effect of each variable on the abnormal 
returns. Most importantly for this thesis, Gardeazabal specifically focuses on conflict events, 
referencing conflict events in developing countries, and leading us to the next set of authors and 
papers. 
 Research exists on the effects of conflict on national economies (Caplan, 2002), on the 
effects of terrorism on capital markets (Chen at al., 2004; Chesney et al., 2005), on the effects of 
violence and conflict on asset markets (Guidolin et al., 2005) and on the effects of conflict on a 
specific industry, such as diamonds, in a frontier market, Angola (Guidolin et al., 2007).  
 Caplan examines the output of a range of countries during wartime. Caplan separates the 
effect of foreign and domestic wars on these countries and using pooled time series, finds that 
whilst domestic wars substantially reduce real output, foreign wars slightly increase real output. 
Caplan’s data is primarily macroeconomic and the results deal with such macroeconomic topics 
as aggregate output. Whilst Caplan did inform this thesis, ultimately we are looking at a wholly 
different category of data and results. 
 Chen and Siems analyze the effects of 14 terrorist and military attacks, some of which are 
targeted against the US, from 1915 to 2001, on capital markets in the US. Using basic event 
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study methodology as referenced in Gardeazabal (2010), they measure abnormal returns relative 
to the prior month as well as cumulative abnormal returns for the next two weeks. Chen and 
Siems determine that contemporary markets recover faster from these acts than those in the past 
did. The authors utilize basic abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns methodology, as 
mentioned in Gardeazabal’s paper earlier, to compile their data. They then utilize ordinary least 
squares regressions to determine their results. Their work is a simple study in compiling stock 
market price data into abnormal returns and using basic parametric methods to determine the 
effect of their events data on the stock markets under study. This thesis borrows this framework 
from them. Chesney and Reshetar, employ three methods to study the effects of 77 terrorist 
events in 25 countries over 11 years on multiple markets and industries in the developed world. 
They use event studies, non-parametric methodology and GARCH-Extreme Value Theory (EVT) 
methods. Chesney et al. find that non-parametric methodology is the simplest and best way to 
determine the effects of violent events on world markets. Using this methodology they find that 
US markets are least affected by terrorist and violent events, they also find that oil stocks can 
experience mixed reactions to these events depending on how tight the supply of worldwide oil 
is, and on whether the events lead to a decrease in transport use (such as a decrease in passenger 
flights after 9/11). Prior to studying the effects of events on the Angolan diamond industry 
(Guidolin et al., 2007); Guidolin and La Ferrara studied the effects of violent conflict (internal 
and international) on worldwide markets. In their 2005 paper they studied the effects of over 100 
violent events, taken over a span of 30 years, on various stock markets. Using basic event study 
methods, they determined the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns that each event 
had on the markets under study. Their findings indicated that US markets reacted positively to 
conflict, especially international conflict.  
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 In 2007, Guidolin and La Ferrara focused on the effects of events on the returns of 
diamond mining firms in Angola. They used similar event study methods to Chen and Siems, i.e., 
finding cumulative abnormal returns over an event window. However, Guidolin and La Ferrara 
also applied hypothesis testing in order to determine the significance of their abnormal returns 
results. Finally they employed a control portfolio of diamond miners that were not active in 
Angola to isolate only those events that affected diamond miners in Angola. Guidolin and 
Ferrara found that the decades long civil war in Angola caused positive returns for diamond 
miners operating in that country, they reason that this was due to conflict-generated entry 
barriers, as well as increased bargaining power for miners in dealing with the Angolan 
government. 
 Guidolin and La Ferrara’s work utilized similar methods to Chen and Siems, however 
they reason that due to the relatively small sample size as well as due to the focus of their 
research on one industry in one country there will be a tendency for fat tails leading to incorrect 
or vague results when using parametric testing. They applied non-parametric Wilcoxian sign 
rank tests, in order to account for these possible fat tails. They also introduced a control group of 
firms that operated outside of the country of study to gauge if a difference existed between the 
returns of the two groups of firms as a result of events within the country under study. 
 Other than Guidolin and La Ferrara’s work, no research appears clearly evident on the 
effects of conflict and malevolent acts on the equity values of specific firms operating in 
emerging and frontier markets. However, it is possible to use the aforementioned mentioned 
research as a baseline for developing data collection and dissemination methods as well as 
determining results and the significance of those results. Saez, Fratzscher and Thimann (2007), 
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provide insights on the collection and categorization of events data in order to facilitate effective 
modeling and testing. Corrado (2011) provides a thorough selection of modeling techniques but 
his most important purpose is to lead us to Gardeazabal. Gardeazabal (2010) affirms the use of 
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns when performing event studies using stock 
price data. Chen and Siems (2004), apply similar methods to those expounded upon by 
Gardeazabal to determine the effect of violent events on stock prices. Finally, Guidolin and La 
Ferrara apply the same methods to a specific emerging market for a specific industry, they also 
introduce non-parametric testing via Wilcoxian sign rank tests to account for the fat tails that can 
be generated In the data as a consequence of focusing so strongly on one industry and emerging 
market country. 
 Using this collected research we are able to formulate a data creation, compilation and 
testing methodology in order to develop an analysis for the effects of locally originating 
malevolent acts on MNOCs operating in Nigeria.  
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Table 1.Recent work on the effects of malevolent acts on markets and a general abstract of their results 
Paper Title Author Key results as they pertain to this work 
The economics effects of 
violent conflict: evidence from 
asset market reactions (2005) 
M. Guidolin and 
E. La Ferrara 
1) US markets respond positively to conflict events, 
2) International conflicts have a stronger effect on stock 
prices than internal conflicts. 
Diamonds are Forever, Wars 
are Not. Is Conflict Bad for 
Private Firms? (2007) 
M. Guidolin and 
E. La Ferrara 
1) Diamond firms with Angolan operations  experienced 
above average returns from violence and civil war, 
2) The cessation of hostilities in Angola led to negative 
abnormal returns for diamond firms located in Angola, and 
positive returns for those with no operations in the country. 
The Impact of Terrorism on 
Financial Markets: An 
Empirical Study (2010) 
M. Chesney and 
G. Reshetar 
1) US stock markets exhibit the least reaction to malevolent 
acts of any worldwide stock market, 
2) Oil and gas stocks experience both negative and positive 
price moves as a result of malevolent acts, 
Negative 
 Malevolent acts lead to a decrease in transport use 
and a subsequent decline in oil and gas demand 
Positive 
 Malevolent acts that affect supply will cause 
positive price moves if oil supply is already tight 
The effects of terrorism on 
global capital markets (2004) 
A.H. Chen and 
T.F. Siems 
1) US markets experience negative returns as a result of 
worldwide malevolent acts, albeit of a lower magnitude than 
most other stock markets, 
2) US markets recover faster from negative price moves 
caused by malevolent acts than most other stock markets. 
The Transmission of Emerging 
Market Shocks to Global 
Equity Markets (2007) 
L.C. Saez, M. 
Fratzscher and C. 
Thimann 
1) Emerging market shocks affect world markets by 0.3% (on 
average) on the day of the event 




3. Hypothesis Development 
In this thesis we raise three hypotheses regarding the direct and indirect effects of negative as 
well as positive events on firms operating within a country.  We assume that a firm’s returns are 
the best indicator of the extent of the effect that an event has on said firm. Returns fluctuate 
based on the firm’s income, and income derives from the sale of a product or service. Thus when 
a firm experiences a loss in its ability to create the product or service it will experience lower 
income and consequently lower returns. In terms of oil firms, oil is the product from which 
income is derived, an event (such as sabotage or the kidnap of crucial employees) that lowers the 
target firm’s capability to produce oil will thus lead to lower income and lower returns. These 
effects may be generalized over a group of target firms or localized to individual ones; similarly 
some events may produce more pronounced effects.  
In terms of the Nigerian oil region, target means all MNOCs operating therein. The 
region is isolated to a very small area when compared to other oil regions, meaning that MNOCs 
operate in close proximity to each other. Our belief is that this agglomeration can suggest that 
events affecting one MNOC will also impact all nearby MNOCs especially those caused by 
MEND. MEND’s operations are extensive enough that it could conceivably affect every MNOC 
in the region, thus a negative event caused by MEND against one MNOC may cause the others 
to believe that they will be targeted next.  It could also suggest that the oil price for Nigerian oil 
is determined almost exclusively by events within this relatively tiny region, thus a negative 
event could affect the price of Nigerian oil which in turn could affect the returns of all other 




Hypothesis #1 [DIRECT EFFECTS]:  
An event wherein a physically aggressive or hostile action is taken against a target (whether it’s 
to property, operations or personnel) will have a negative effect on the returns of the target. 
Two studies discussed in the literature review support the hypothesis that negative events lead to 
negative returns. The work by Chen et al. (2004), wherein a clear negative abnormal return was 
observed on stock markets after a terrorist event, served as a good general overview in order to 
frame the hypothesis. Guidolin et al. (2007), observed the negative effects of violent events on 
the returns of diamond firms that specifically operate in the diamond industry within Angola. We 
are attempting a similar study here. Based on the work of Chen et al. (2004) and Guidolin et al 
(2007), we expect that our testing will yield the result that negative events in Nigeria lead to 
negative abnormal returns for the MNOCs in our study. Herein we state our second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis #2 [DIRECT EFFECTS: POSITIVE VS. NEGATIVE]:  
A. Negative events targeting a specific firm will cause that firm’s returns to fall;  
B. Positive events targeting a specific firm will cause that firm’s returns to rise.  
As an appendix to that hypothesis, we expect some firms’ returns to respond more strongly to the 
different event types. This hypothesis is an offshoot of the first hypothesis discussed above.  
Specifically we state that if a negative event targets an individual firm, that target will experience 
a drop in stock price for reasons mentioned above. Conversely if the same firm experiences a 
positive event, its returns will increase.  
Guidolin et al. (2007) observed that some negative events did in fact lead to positive 
returns for the affected firm’s competitors or for firms not operating within that market. Based on 
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the reasons mentioned for the first hypothesis and on the theory of efficient markets we expect 
that an event of a negative nature affecting a specific MNOC will lead to negative returns for 
said MNOC operating in the region and positive returns for the other MNOCs operating within 
the region. This leads to our third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis #3 [CROSS EFFECTS – INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL]:  
A. We hypothesize that a negative event affecting one firm may lead to positive returns for that 
firm’s competitors. 
B.  Negative events within the country of study will lead to positive returns for competing firms 
whom do not have interests in the country 
For part B, we simply compared the returns of all the MNOCs in Nigeria during a negative event 
with that of BP, the only MNOC not operating in Nigeria. Based on Guidolin et al. (2007), we 
expect BP to have positive returns when negative events in Nigeria occur to MNOCs operating 





We focus our attention on Nigerian events only as the primary purpose of this thesis is to 
determine the effects of events in the developing market and not in the developed or home 
market of the target firm. Historical stock price data was collected for each firm under study, as 
well as for the NYSE,  between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2010,  from Yahoo Finance. 
An extensive review of news sources was conducted for this time period and incidents involving 
malevolent acts against the four major MNOCs operating in Nigeria (Shell, Chevron, Exxon 
Mobil and Total SA) were isolated. For the purposes of this thesis, malevolent acts are limited to 
the following:  
 Oil pipeline attacks,  
 Oil facility attacks and, 
 Kidnapping of oil company personnel or their relatives.  
These malevolent acts were chosen because they are the ones that strike right at the heart of each 
MNOC’s operations, and consequently have an effect at the source. Pipeline and facility attacks 
prevent the production of oil, and effectively diminish the affected MNOC’s capability to 
generate revenue. Kidnappings of employees diminish the available manpower and have an 
effect on employee morale. Kidnappings also affect an MNOC’s bottom line as a cash outlay is 
required in order to ransom these hostages. A cash outlay is also necessary in order to repair 
damaged operations equipment; however, the MNOC has the option of not doing so, whereas the 
MNOC must pay a ransom, or risk facing harsh public outcry. We isolated malevolent acts that 
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were specifically directed at a single MNOC, in order to determine the effects of events on each 
MNOC and determine if any variation exists between the effects on each.  
 Countrywide events, those that could have an impact on all oil companies in Nigeria, 
were also collected. These included threats issued by the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND) against MNOCs operating in Nigeria, general undirected violence within 
the oil region, as well as political actions and decrees that may be perceived as being to the 
detriment of the MNOCs. Examples of the latter include, tariffs against foreign MNOCs or the 
administration of new laws and procedures designed to favor local firms over the MNOCs. 
 Finally, data was collected for positive events; this was collected via the same method as 
those for negative events. These events include the release of hostages employed by a specific 
MNOC as well as truces negotiated with MEND. Both are positive for obvious reasons. 
 Altogether, 57 events were found during the range of the survey. The amount for each 
type can be found in Table 2, a description of each event type can be found in Table 3, and a 
summary of each variable studied can be found in Table 4 (please note that we tested for 
coefficients only and as such had no independent variables in our data), the reference material for 
each event can be found in the appendices. Figures graphing the timeline of each event in every 
year from 2006 to 2010 can be found in Figures 1 through 5. Violent events are represented by a 
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Figure 2. Timeline of events compared to returns for the NYSE and our MNOCs - 2007 
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Figure 4. Timeline of events compared to returns for the NYSE and our MNOCs - 2009 
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Table 2.Breakdown of the amount of each type of event 
Event 
type 












17 10 16 13 2 17 6 4 
Table 3.Description of each event type 
Event type Description 
Violent Events that are of a malicious nature and have caused damage to a specific company’s operations 
Kidnap Events wherein workers from a specific oil company have been kidnapped 
Miscellaneous 
negative 
Countrywide economic/political events of a negative aspect in regards to the MNOCs under study and/or the 
Nigerian oil industry 
Positive Events with positive connotations, hostage release, sabotage repairs, truces with MEND 
Miscellaneous neutral Countrywide economic/political events with no discernible link to the MNOCs under study and/or the 
Nigerian oil industry 
Negative - Shell only Violent and kidnap events directed at Shell only 
Negative - Chevron 
only 
Violent and kidnap events directed at Chevron only 
Positive - Shell only Positive events relating to Shell only 
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Table 4.Summary of each dependent variable 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. 
car5 0.0012 0.0322 0.0017 
car10 0.0008 0.0507 0.0027 
ar0 0.0001 0.0126 0.0006 
ar1 0.0010 0.0155 0.0008 
ar2 0.0025 0.0127 0.0006 
Note: Testing for coefficients occurred only, no independent variables were used. 
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 The collection of the dates of events necessitated thorough research through worldwide 
news sources, such as Reuters and CNN, as well local and industry specific sources, such as the 
Nigerian national newspapers and oil and gas industry magazines and reports. Using the criteria 
outlined above possible events were screened and segregated into their various types based on 
keywords within each report/data source. The date of each eligible event was not based on the 
date’s actual occurrence but on the date that the event was recorded and information about it was 
published. In cases where multiple sources recorded the event, the source whose date was earliest 
was used. This was done In order to obtain dates that were as close as possible to the actual date 
that the markets would receive the information. Due to Nigeria’s remote location and the 
especially remote locations of oil operations within that country news of an event may not reach 
the markets for a few days. Unfortunately, most news sources were local or industry specific and 
thus we cannot gauge the exact date that event information was available to the worldwide 
market instead of just select local or industry groups. The delay in some abnormal returns for 
some of our results (especially for kidnappings) may be a result of this information delay. 
Stock price data was collected from publicly available sources for each of the four major 
MNOCs for the day of the event as well as for the 40 days prior to and 10 days after the event. 
Finally, the stock price of BP was used to provide a control oil company with no financial 
position within Nigeria, again using the same parameters as for those MNOC’s operating within 
Nigeria. 
All stock price data was collected in US currency and sourced from the NYSE to 
eliminate anomalies due to currency fluctuations during the 50 day stock price sampling period 
for each event. When the sampling period for an event included a weekend or a day wherein no 
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trading occurred on US stock exchanges, stock price data was recorded for the next trading day 
i.e. if the event occurred on a Saturday, Monday’s stock price was recorded as the actual day of 
the event. This was done because typically news of a market event would not be actionable by 
traders until the next trading day. By the same reasoning, all reasonable attempts were taken to 
determine at what time news of each event was released in order to record stock price on the day 






Using event study methodology as recommended by Gardeazabal (2010), wherein he reviews 
various methods for the measurement of the economic costs of conflict. Event study 
methodology was found to be the best method with which to analyze the data in this thesis, as 
this is typically used to measure the effect on stock prices of individual discrete events. Other 
methods that were considered but ultimately not used were time series, which is best utilized to 
assess changes in overall macroeconomic data as a result of conflict, and panel data methods, 
which are best used together with time series data on a panel of firms or countries and over very 
long time spans. 
From Gardeazabal (2010), the basic calculation of abnormal returns was computed 
starting at time t=0 (i.e., the event date), here the return on the day was compared to the average 
returns over a 31 day long control period ranging from 40 days prior to the event up to 10 days 
prior to the event, this is computed as the following: 
        
 
 
∑   
     
      
Cumulative abnormal returns were also calculated for the first and second weeks after the event 
in order to determine the long term effect of the event on the stock price. 
           (       )      
t = amount of time w.r.t. the event occurrence 
AR = abnormal return 
R = return 
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T = total amount of days = 31 
x = maximum amount of time w.r.t. the event occurrence 
Chen and Siems (2004) used this methodology to analyze the effects on the Dow Jones 
Industrials index of 14 separate worldwide events involving violence or military actions. 
Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) narrowed their focus and applied these calculations to the effect 
of a single event, rebel leader Jonas Savimbi’s death, in a single country, Angola on the stock 
prices of diamond firms operating within the country. 
 Calculations were produced for the abnormal returns of each MNOC, the spot price of 
Nigerian Bonny Light and BP (the control company). The abnormal return for each was 
calculated for the day of the event, as well for the 2 days following the event day, the cumulative 
abnormal returns for the 5 days and 10 days following the event day were also calculated. This 
data was isolated using dummy variables into the various event types.  
 
We tested our hypotheses by assuming that the data was parametric and proceeded to 
determine if there was any significance in the results when conducting ordinary least squares 
regressions on a target’s abnormal returns with respect to certain event types (or combinations 
thereof).  For thoroughness, we assumed that the data was non-parametric and conducted 
Wilcoxian sign rank tests under the same input characteristics as for parametric testing. These 
tests are a simple yet comprehensive way to test our hypothesis, as they incorporate the event 




 We included non-parametric testing in our analysis because our initial parametric tests 
yielded fat tails.  Corrado (2010) suggests that parametric tests may not provide accurate results, 
as the assumptions that the stock price data is parametric may not hold true. Corrado concedes 
that research has shown that stock price data from the NYSE is parametric (which is where data 
for this thesis was sourced). Guidolin et al. (2007)  argue that when dealing with small cross 
sections, fat tails are more likely to occur, yielding inaccurate results when using parametric 
testing, they add that recent econometric literature notes the huge heteroskedasticity that occurs 
in high frequency (daily) data. They also note that clustering of events (more than one stock is 
affected by an event) can create cross-correlation and heteroskedastic effects when more than 
one stock is being investigated for a period longer than a day, effectively violating the 
assumptions of classical parametric tests. Heeding Guidolin’s advice, we conducted non-
parametric testing, applying Wilcoxian Signed Rank Tests as recommended, to account for 





All of the MNOCs under study derive only a small percentage of their revenue from Nigeria, on 
the order of 3% to 5% (according to the 2010 financial statements of Shell, Exxon, Chevron and 
Total SA),   thus if any abnormal returns are being generated by events in Nigeria, their 
significance is obscured by these stock’s strong correlation with the NYSE. However, it also 
means that if a result with some significance were found (that could not be attributed to the 
NYSE), then it has a definite link to a Nigerian event.  These are even more significant than the 
results suggest as they have managed to emerge even under the intense correlation of their 
sources to the NYSE. 
Testing Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis postulated that an event wherein a physically aggressive or hostile action is 
taken against any MNOC target in Nigeria, whether it be to property, operations or personnel, 
will have a negative effect on the returns of all firms with a substantial stake in that industry in 
the country. Our testing identified that this is not the case for all firms, returns for some firms 
responded more acutely to events in general, while some firms’ returns were more affected by 
certain events than others’. Some firm’s returns were even positively impacted by ‘negative’ 
events. Essentially we could not find results of any significance when combining violent, kidnap 
and miscellaneous negative event types together into a general negative event condition.  
To gain more insight we focused our testing on each negative event type, violent, kidnap 
and miscellaneous negative and analyzed the effect of each event type on the MNOCs. This 
allowed us to test the specific effect that each event type had on the MNOCs in our study.  We 
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found significant results for miscellaneous negative as well as for kidnap events, using 
parametric testing, see Table 5.  
We found very little evidence regarding the lack of significant results for violent events; 
we propose three arguments that could explain this situation:  
 The results are obscured by each MNOC’s strong correlation to the NYSE, the returns 
correlate roughly 100 to 200 times stronger than a typical significant correlation obtained 
during hypothesis testing, 
 The market does not take violent events into account, investors simply ignore news of violent 
events, violence has become viewed as a cost of doing business in Nigeria for the past two 
decades or more,  
 Market perception may also be that since MEND has never attacked two facilities 
simultaneously (at least not between 2006 and 2010), once an attack occurs against one 
facility the others are safe for the time-being 
 The supply shocks caused by violent events lead to price increases in Nigerian oil leading to 
increased revenues (and returns) for the MNOCs, as per basic economic theory, if supply 
decreases and demand remains static, equilibrium price will increase. (Please note that we 
profer this argument tentatively as nothing prevents the consumer from sourcing oil from 
other international suppliers) 
When isolating for kidnap events, we found results of significance with respect to Shell. 
These are supported by the fact that kidnap events are a relatively new occurrence for Shell and 
that the firm has recently begun to lower the exposure of its employees to kidnapping, suggesting 
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that there is a definite negative impact on Shell from kidnap events. Other results for kidnap 
events show evidence that negative returns for Shell lead to positive returns for Shell’s 
competitors in Nigeria, Chevron, Exxon and Total, this cross-effect is discussed in the section for 
Hypothesis #1, although it relates to hypothesis #3 as the kidnap event data set features many 
Shell kidnap events. 
Our results for the effect of miscellaneous negative events on returns appear to support 
our conclusion that MNOCs may actually earn positive returns as a result of supply shocks due 
to an increase in the market price for Nigerian oil (caused by a decrease in supply). When the 
government introduces measures that will effectively lower or constrain supply, and effectively 
increase the market price for Nigerian Bonny Light, all of our MNOCs experience significant 
positive returns. 
To gain further insight into the effects of the different negative events we next study each 
event type in isolation.  
Violent events only 
The results we discovered for the effects of violent events were severely limited, with only 
Chevron, and to a lesser extent Total, exhibiting outcomes of any significance. Regression 
testing revealed that violent events had a positive effect on the mid-term returns of Chevron, 
0.011335, significant at 90%, see Table 5. 
 Wilcoxian sign rank testing confirmed that Chevron’s returns are significantly different 
from zero and positive a day after a violent event occurs, 1.811, significant at 90%, as well as 




 We have a few theories regarding this lack of significant results, any single theory or a 
combination thereof may be the cause. First the strong correlation that the MNOC stocks have to 
the NYSE could obscure any results that ordinarily would be significant. Meaning that market 
forces or events that affected the NYSE may have occurred during the time period during which 
some of our violent events occurred, effectively causing our MNOC’s returns to react to those 
events and not to violent events in Nigeria. 
Secondly, perhaps violent events against a MNOCs operation in Nigeria are not 
perceived by the market as significant in the grand scheme of things, leading investors to 
disregard this information and to consequently place less value on its significance, leading to 
smaller abnormal returns. Alternatively, investors may feel that because one facility was attacked, 
the others are safe for the time-being as MEND has a limited range of operations and manpower. 
This has some credence as MEND has never struck multiple facilities simultaneously during the 
five year range for which data was collected for this thesis. 
Finally, when any oil producer’s production capacity is lowered, supply obviously 
decreases and thus according to equilibrium theory, price increases assuming demand remains 
constant. Nigeria’s oil region is tiny compared to that of other oil regions and it produces only 
one type of oil, Nigerian Bonny Light. The country’s oil supply is very tight and isolated from 
other regions, meaning that the occurrence of a supply shock, such as one caused by a violent 
event that disrupts oil output capacity, will lead to an absolute drop in the supply of Nigerian 
Bonny Light. This oil is almost exclusively sold in the US market thus any price effects as a 
result of supply shocks are focused on the US. This means that negative results could be 
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obscured by the positive effects of increased market prices (and revenue) for Nigerian oil. This is 
the least probable cause as Bonny Light comprises a comparatively small amount of the world 
oil supply, and consumers have other worldwide supply options. 
The results show that there is no evidence to suggest that the hypothesis is supported at 
least in terms of violent events, in fact, the opposite is possibly true. If we follow the thread of 
our final theory mentioned above, Chevron and Total’s returns may simply be more strongly 
correlated to the price movements of Nigerian Bonny Light than the other MNOCs. This theory 
could account for the fact that violent events have been affecting the Nigerian operations of the 
MNOCs under study for over a decade prior to our first data point, yet little has changed in the 
way these firms have conducted business in Nigeria, that is until a recent increase in the number 
of kidnappings has forced some MNOCs to change course. 
Kidnap events only 
When agglomerating the MNOCs under study, regression testing revealed that kidnap events had 
a significant negative effect on the returns of all the MNOCs operating in Nigeria. Further 
regression testing indicated a more complex result.  Having found no results of significance 
when grouping all the MNOCs operating in Nigeria, we decided to attempt grouping triplets and 
pairs of MNOCs to determine if perhaps a single MNOC or two may be disproportionately 
affecting our outcome. 
We did not find results of any significance when isolating for three MNOCs, however 
when isolating for pairs of MNOCs, it was revealed that some MNOC combinations exhibited 
significant abnormal returns. For example, the long term effects of all kidnap events on Shell and 
Total’s abnormal returns is decidedly negative, -0.01842 at the 95% significance level. Whereas 
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the mid-term effects of all kidnap events on Chevron and Total’s abnormal returns is positive, 
0.009341, at the 90% significance level. In general, results with the highest significance were 
determined two days after the kidnap event occurred, with an average result of 0.006 and a 
standard error 0.002. The most significant results, at the 99% significance level, occurred when 
isolating for Exxon and Total, occurring two days after the event takes place, 0.006921; as well 
as when isolating for Exxon and Chevron, again two days after the event, 0.010533, see Table 5.  
We did isolate for the effects of kidnap events on a single MNOC, however a discussion 
of that analysis is not germane to hypothesis #1. Isolating the effects of kidnap events on each 
MNOC technically applies to hypothesis #3, especially since the majority of the kidnap events in 
our data set are actually targeted at Shell. For continuity, we have decided to include the results 
and discussion under this subsection and not under’ Testing hypothesis #3’. When isolating for 
kidnap event conditions we noticed that Shell experienced negative returns and that Shell’s 
competitors, Chevron and Exxon, exhibited positive returns. Shell’s results were only significant 
in the long term and were decidedly negative, -0.01842, significant at 90%. Whereas, Chevron’s 
and Exxon’s results were both strongly positive and significant two days after the event took 
place, 0.010749 (significant at 95%), and 0.010317 (significant at 99%), respectively. Refer to 




Non-parametric testing using Wilcoxian sign rank testing revealed that the abnormal 
returns of all the MNOC’s were significantly different from zero and positive, both one and two 
days after a kidnap event, z=1.774, significant at 90% and z=3.307, significant at 95%, 
respectively. Refer to Table 6 below. 
 The same test found that Shell’s abnormal returns were negatively different from zero in 
the long term, although at 88% significance. Whereas Chevron’s returns were significantly 
different from zero, two days after a kidnap event, z=2.193, significant at 95%, confirming our 
parametric test results. 
As the effects of kidnap events were primarily visible two days after such an event 
occurred, we postulate that this is caused by a delay in the news of the event reaching markets. 
Typically, a kidnap event is not registered until the kidnappers ask for a ransom; even then, 
knowledge of the event is not published until later for fear of antagonizing the kidnappers. 
Results showing abnormal returns two days after a kidnap event occurs seem reasonable in this 
case.  The disparity between the effect on Shell’s returns and that of Chevron could be explained 
if more kidnappings were directed at Shell employees or if Chevron responded more swiftly than 
Shell to the kidnappings of its employees. Certainly, the presence of several high exposure 
kidnappings related to Shell in the dataset could account for the negative results seen, such as the 
kidnapping of the toddler daughter of a Shell employee on July 5
th
, 2007.  Shell’s restructuring 
of business operations during the past 5 years may also confirm our results; the company has 
outsourced a large portion of its work to local firms and smaller operators, thus lowering the 
amount of Shell employees in the country. Shell has rarely outsourced or decreased operations 
significantly in Nigeria during the two decades that it experienced violent events (Omeje, 2006). 
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That Chevron, Exxon and Total experience positive returns as a result of kidnap events is 
less easy to explain. We postulate that as these companies are in direct competition with Shell, 
and kidnappings of Shell employees are perceived as being especially negative by the markets, 
any negative effect on Shell would cause its competitors’ returns to increase. 
 Again, our results are mixed; we can conclusively say that there is evidence that our 
hypothesis is correct at least in terms of the effects of kidnap events on Shell’s returns. The 
opposite is true for kidnap events for Chevron, Exxon and Total, whose returns appear to 
increase when kidnap events occur. The relatively high proportion of kidnap events studied, 
wherein Shell employees were the target, supports our conclusion that kidnap events lead to 
negative returns for the affected MNOC as well as supporting another hypothesis we made, that 
negative returns for one MNOC lead to positive returns for that MNOCs competitors. 
These results also lead us to conclude that unlike violent events which affect the entire 
market for Nigerian oil, kidnap events affect individual MNOCs.  
Miscellaneous negative events only 
Corollary to the surprisingly positive results noticed for kidnap events, miscellaneous negative 
events yielded positive abnormal returns for all MNOCs operating in Nigeria. These events 
included measures by the Nigerian government to restrict the oil operations of foreign MNOCs 
in Nigeria as well as measures to grant competitive advantages to local firms over the much 
larger MNOCs. Our reasoning is that these events are negative because they restrict our 
MNOC’s operations and ability to produce oil and consequently revenue. Parametric testing, via 
ordinary least squares regression, revealed that significant results didn’t manifest until two days 
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after the event. And then was only visible for Shell and Total’s returns. See Table 5 for a full 
results summary.  
Non-parametric testing, using Wilcoxian sign rank testing, confirmed these results, it was 
observed that the abnormal returns of all MNOCs operating in Nigeria differed significantly 
from zero and were positive. Results a day after the event were significant at the 95% level, 
z=2.299, and those two days after the event were significant at 99%, z=2.848, see Table 6. 
This paradoxical outcome could be explained by two factors; first, markets interpret the 
MNOC’s oil operations in Nigeria negatively, thus an event that would lead to a perceived 
withdrawal/diminishment of an MNOC’s operations from/in Nigeria could lead to positive 
returns. The markets may view a pull-out from Nigeria as a signal that the MNOC will 
concentrate on more profitable ventures and reap larger profits in the future. Conversely, markets 
may interpret that these seemingly negative political events will forcibly lower a MNOC’s 
exposure to risks in Nigeria, thus decreasing operational volatility and increasing returns.  
Alternatively, the markets may perceive that local firms will operate less efficiently than our 
MNOCs, leading to less output and less supply to the market, causing higher prices for Nigerian 
Bonny Light and consequently higher returns for our MNOCs (per our discussion in an earlier 
section). 
Positive events only 
Testing was conducted on returns during positive events, such as the release of hostages, or 
truces with MEND. No significant results were found at all, using neither parametric regression 
testing nor non-parametric sign rank testing.  
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This either suggests that the markets do not respond to positive events or that extraneous 
impacts on the NYSE obscured any results. We suspect the former, as our dataset showed 
isolated individual cases of positive abnormal returns for a MNOC immediately after the hostage 
release of its employees; refer to Appendix A for a description of each event and the abnormal 
returns associated with each one.   
Testing Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis is that negative events affecting a firm will cause that firm’s returns to 
fall, and vice versa. We also expect some firms’ returns to respond more strongly to the different 
event types, i.e., Violence, kidnappings or positive events. Results obtained by testing the 
hypothesis #1 illustrated the fact that negative events do have some impact on the returns of the 
MNOCs under study, with restrictions. However, events directed specifically at an MNOC, such 
as event types “Negative Shell only” and “Negative Chevron only”, do not provide significant 
results for this hypothesis we isolated only those events that affected specific MNOC’s and 
compared that to the returns of those MNOC’s. We could only isolate events in this way for two 
MNOCs, Shell and Chevron, and consequently only conducted testing on those firms. 
Our findings did not identify any significant link between a negative event targeted at a 
firm and that firm’s returns when assuming that the data is parametric and thus using ordinary 
least squares regression. We reason that this may be due to the opposite effects each event type 
has on returns, for example, violent events engendered positive returns (per hypothesis #1’s 
results) and kidnap events engendered negative returns (for Shell). When combined, these 




Testing Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis that this thesis makes is that a negative event affecting a single target firm 
may lead to positive returns for that firm’s competitors and that negative events within the 
country will lead to positive returns for MNOCs whom do not have interests in the country. 
Using parametric testing, absolutely no significant results were found to confirm this hypothesis 
when the event condition included every negative event affecting Shell or Chevron. This does 
not mean that the hypothesis is incorrect; it is possible that if there is an effect its value is tiny 
compared to the scale and scope of each firm. The source for this hypothesis, Guidolin’s (2007)  
results, were based on firms with a larger portion of revenue coming from Angola and with less 
diversity of income sources than the MNOCs under study in this thesis. A significant result 
appears when using Wilcoxian sign rank tests; here Exxon’s returns have a strong positive 
correlation and display significant results, at 95%, in response to negative Shell events. See 
Table 6. 
When testing the second part of this hypothesis we concentrated on BP’s return’s data 
only.  Ordinary least squares regression testing shows very weak significance; a few results reach 
80% significance, but most hover in the 40% to 60% range. When isolating for each event type, 
there is a mild positive returns response to violent events and a mild negative returns response to 
kidnap events, assuming the data is parametric. Wilcoxian sign rank testing identifies a much 
stronger link, significance values for returns for BP when tested against violent events are 94%, 




It should be noted that we did find proof to support this hypothesis, albeit via testing 
hypothesis #1. When isolating for kidnap event conditions we noticed that Shell experienced 
negative returns and that Shell’s competitors, Chevron and Exxon, exhibited positive returns, 
refer to Table 6 for full results. A more thorough discussion of these results can be found under 




Table 5.Results of parametric OLS regression testing 
Dependant 
variable 







AR1  Miscellaneous negative 
events 
All MNOCs operating in 
Nigeria 
0.00671* 0.00288 44 0.00001 
AR1 Kidnap events All MNOCs operating in 
Nigeria 
-0.00486 + 0.00249 40 0.00001 
CAR5 Violent events Chevron 0.01134 + 0.00591 19 0.00001 
AR0 Kidnap events Chevron and Total 0.00380 + 0.00205 20 0.00001 
AR2 Kidnap events Shell and Chevron 0.00638 * 0.00249 20 0.00001 
AR2 Kidnap events Shell and Exxon 0.00616 * 0.00221 20 0.00001 
AR2 Kidnap events Exxon and Total 0.00692 ** 0.00227 20 0.00001 
AR2 Kidnap events Chevron and Total 0.00714 * 0.00255 20 0.00001 
AR2 Kidnap events Chevron and Exxon 0.01053 ** 0.00235 20 0.00001 
CAR10 Kidnap events Shell and Total -0.01842 * 0.00743 20 0.00001 
AR2 Kidnap events Chevron 0.01075 * 0.00377 10 0.00001 
AR2 Kidnap events Exxon 0.01032 ** 0.00300 10 0.00001 
CAR10 Kidnap events Shell -0.01842 + 0.00990 10 0.00001 




0.00891 * 0.00352 11 0.00001 
AR2 Miscellaneous negative 
events 
Total 0.00750 * 0.00338 11 0.00001 




Table 6.Results of non-parametric Wilcoxian sign rank testing 






Are the abnormal returns for Chevron significantly different from 0, 1 day after a violent event? 1.811  + 19 617.50 
Are the abnormal returns for Chevron significantly different from 0, 2 days after a kidnap event? 2.193   * 10 96.13 
Are all MNOC's (operating in Nigeria) abnormal returns significantly different from 0, 1 day after a 
kidnap event? 
1.774  + 40 5534.50 





Are all MNOC's (except BP) abnormal returns significantly different from 0, 1 day after a 
miscellaneous negative event? 
2.299   * 44 7342.50 
Are all MNOC's (except BP) abnormal returns significantly different from 0, 2 days after a 
miscellaneous negative event? 




Are the abnormal returns for Exxon significantly different from 0, 1 day after a negative event 
affects Shell?  
2.344  * 
 
17 446.00 
Are the midterm abnormal returns of BP significantly different from 0, after a violent event?  1.690  + 19 617.50 




This thesis studied the effects of malevolent acts in a developing market on the performance of 
the targeted entity in its home market. This work borrowed inspiration from Saez et al. (2007) 
and their analysis of the transmission of shocks in developing markets to developed markets, as 
well as from Chen et al. (2004) and Chesney et al. (2010), who studied the effects of violent 
events on the returns of stock markets. In terms of method and data organization, Guidolin et al.  
(2007) was consulted, their coverage of the Angolan diamond industry provided inspiration 
(along with Cilliers et al. (2000) and Le Billon (2000))  for choosing our example, the Nigerian 
oil industry. 
 Nigeria’s oil industry is one of the ten most bountiful in the world; its resources are 
concentrated into a single comparatively tiny region called the Niger Delta. The product, 
Nigerian Bonny Light oil, is primarily sold to the US market and is considered to be of very high 
quality. Unfortunately, this font of plentiful oil has caused disaster in the Niger Delta both 
environmental and humanitarian. The country has few environmental controls and thus oil firms 
pollute heedlessly to save costs, and crony capitalism is prevalent as politicians at all levels seek 
to funnel as much oil wealth as they can. This situation has led to many of the area’s residents to 
protest and ultimately to take up arms against the government and specifically the oil firms. A 
lack of other opportunities has also funneled willing young men from the area to the local anti-
government and anti-oil militia MEND. MEND is the lead antagonist in this region, responsible 
for most malevolent acts for the past two decades. 
During a period of five years from 2006 to 2010, we collected 57 events and divided 
them into eight individual event types.  We then collected stock price data for each of the four 
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MNOCs and determined abnormal returns for each one. We had three hypotheses that we tested 
via linear regression and sign-rank techniques. An event wherein a physically aggressive or 
hostile action is taken against a target (whether it’s to property, operations or personnel) will 
have a negative effect on the returns of the target. Negative events targeting a specific firm will 
cause that firm’s returns to fall and, positive events targeting a specific firm will cause that 
firm’s returns to rise. A negative event affecting one firm may lead to positive returns for that 
firm’s competitors and negative events within the country of study will lead to positive returns 
for competing firms whom do not have interests in the country. 
 Prior to conducting hypothesis testing we decided to conduct a linear regression to see 
how strongly the stock prices of our MNOCs follow the NYSE, in order to determine how 
closely the returns of our MNOCs track the NYSE (the exchange on which they are listed). It 
was noticed that the MNOC’s returns do track the NYSE extremely strongly, but this is to be 
expected as the data comes from the NYSE.  Our testing found some evidence that the returns of 
the MNOCs do respond to malevolent acts; although what was more telling was the absence of 
effects. For instance, violent events did not register any significant effect on our MNOCs, we 
postulate that this could be due to events in other markets that the MNOCs responded to more 
strongly, or a lack of concern on the part of the markets about the effect of this violence on the 
bottom line of the MNOCs or less likely it could be caused by a general obscuration of the 
returns picture caused by a price increase for Nigerian oil concurrent with the supply decrease 
caused by the violent event 
 Analysis of kidnappings (kidnap events) and government policies targeted against 
MNOCs (miscellaneous negative events) provided significant results. When isolating for all 
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kidnappings only, we found that Shell experienced negative returns, whereas its competitors, 
Chevron and Exxon experienced positive returns, suggesting that the latter two firms prosper 
from kidnap events. Given that most of the kidnap events in our sample where directed at Shell, 
we reason that the results we obtained for kidnap events confirm that hypothesis 2A and 3 are 
correct, negative events against a specific firm do lead to negative returns for said firm, and 
negative events affecting one firm will cause their competitors returns to rise, respectively.   
Shell and Total’s returns were paradoxically positive as a result of government policies 
that should cause negative returns. We reason that this is so due to markets perceiving the 
MNOC’s operations in Nigeria negatively, i.e. that less involvement in Nigeria will lead to more 
involvement in more lucrative markets for these firms. Markets may also perceive Nigerian oil 
operations as being risky, thus less involvement leads to less risk and consequently higher 
returns. Finally the markets could perceive that the MNOCs produce more oil more efficiently 
than the local competitors that these policies will now assist, thus leading to less supply and a 
higher price.  
 In undertaking this thesis, we hoped to inform the reader about possible reasons behind 
the continuation of this situation in the Niger Delta. Our findings are paradoxical, in that basic 
business theory dictates that anything that lessens a firm’s ability to produce a profitable product 
would directly translate into a loss for that firm, and thus the firm needs to prevent such a thing 
from occurring. In the case of Nigeria, the firms udner study have a perverse incentive to allow 
such extraneous behavior to continue.  If our analysis of the results is correct, there is no 
incentive for the oil firms to change the status quo in terms of initiatives to lessen violent attacks 
as according to our postulations the supply decrease caused by destroying supply capacity simply 
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leads to an increase in the price for Nigerian oil (leading to increased revenues from sales).  
There is also an incentive on the part of each MNOC to prevent kidnapping of its own personnel, 
if anything this is the overriding objective for the MNOC operating in Nigeria, and the recent 
increase in kidnappings of oil company employees may be one reason why firms are finally 
trying to address problems in the Niger Delta. Finally, it seems that there is an incentive, at least 
for the efficient MNOCs, to engender government policies that foster a more competitive 
environment.  
 The situation affecting multinational oil companies in Nigeria is not unique, many 
MNOCs experience similar conditions in countries around the world. A study of the effects of 
these conditions on a firm’s performance should be essential, given the increasing 
interconnectedness of the global economy. Many models of market and business behavior are 
based on extensive study of events within developed markets.  In order to better understand the 
global marketplace, further study needs to take place on developing/emerging markets as well as 
the events most likely to occur in those markets, such as violence, kidnapping, sudden 
government policy changes. Simply applying the current knowledge base on developed markets 
to predict behavior in developing ones is not adequate. The author hopes that this thesis can 
serve as a basis for calculating the effects of malevolent acts on firms operating in other markets 
as well as informing the business strategy of firms operating within such an environment. It 
should be noted that this thesis only addresses the effects of a focused set of events on a single 
industry in an emerging market, and care should be taken when applying the results of this thesis 




8. Future Work 
This work was a focused extension of the works by Chen et al. (2004) and Guidolin et al. (2007); 
every effort has been taken to incorporate their research methods and techniques into this work. 
However, we cannot assume that these authors’ work is perfect, nor can we assume that this 
work is, certain elements could definitely be expounded upon.  
One way in which this work can be improved is by sourcing data from a variety of stock 
exchanges instead of just one to determine the effects of events on different markets as well as to 
mitigate the correlation effects of one stock exchange on the results, such as the NYSE had on 
the data for this work. It should be noted that data collection for this work was limited by the 
lack of dependable daily stock price data available on the Nigerian stock exchange. If it had been 
readily available, data from the Nigerian stock exchange could have mitigated the strong 
correlation our data had with the NYSE. Ultimately, some of the MNOCs under study were not 
registered on the Nigerian stock exchange, and those that were did not present historical prices 
that ranged as far back as the beginning of our study. 
Utilizing other methods of manipulating the data may also be possible. All the authors of 
event study papers dealing with violent events or events related to conflict suggested the same 
methods that we used in this thesis; however there is no reason that volatility studies cannot be 
conducted, such as using GARCH methods to determine the volatility of a stock price after an 
event. In this case a base case volatility can be created prior to an event, by studying the 
volatility of the stock’s price from 40 to 10 days prior to the event. This base case can then be 
compared to the volatility of the stock price after an event occurs to discern if the event has an 
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impact on the stock price. This method may present an altogether different result, or it may help 
to clarify our results. 
The results have shown that violent events exhibit no visible effect on the abnormal 
returns of the MNOCs. Extending the timeline over which data is collected may present a clearer 
picture of the effect of violent events. Similarly, a clearer picture may emerge about the effects 
of positive events as well as kidnap and miscellaneous negative events. 
The methods and techniques utilized in this work could be applied to the oil industry in 
neighboring countries to develop a comparison between the effects of malevolent acts in these 
countries; some examples include the oil industry in Angola, Libya, Iraq or Kuwait.  In the case 
of Angola, a study of the effects of the end of malevolent acts in the diamond industry was 
already conducted by Guidolin & La Ferrara, and study on the effects of these same events on 
the oil industry may be feasible. In the case of Libya, a study on the effects of the government’s 
downward spiral and eventual collapse on world markets should be relatively easy to achieve 
using the methods contained in this work, as long as reliable data is available. A study based on 
Iraq could track the effects of major events within that country on abnormal returns for firms 
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Table A2. Event references by date and event type 
Date Event Reference 
January-11-06 Violent “Nigerian Oil Platform Attacked, Militias Battling Troops”,  January 15, 2006, Associated Press 
January-11-06 Kidnap “Nigerian Oil Platform Attacked, Militias Battling Troops”,  January 15, 2006, Associated Press 
January-15-06 Violent T. Ashby, “Attacks threaten Nigerian oil flow”, January 17, 2006, Reuters 
January-30-06 Positive 
H. Igbikiuwubo, J. Ajani, and S. Oyadongha, “I Won't Come Back to Nigeria – Hostage”, February 1, 2006, The 
Vanguard 
February-18-06 Kidnap E. Okpani, “Hostages: Security Beefed Up in Niger-Delta”, February 20, 2006, The Daily Trust 
February-20-06 Violent J. Mouawad, “Violence In Nigeria Sends Oil Higher”, February 21, 2006, New York Times 
March-01-06 Positive O. Orere, and C. Okafar, “ Militants free six hostage”, March 2, 2006, The Guardian (Nigeria) 
March-09-06 Kidnap M. Ebonugwo, “The Militants and Their Hostages”, March 15, 2006, The Vanguard 
March-10-06 Positive M. Ebonugwo, “The Militants and Their Hostages”, March 15, 2006, The Vanguard 




“Militants Explode Car Bomb At Military Base In Oil Hub”, April 21, 2006, New York Times 
 
June-02-06 Kidnap “Foreign oil workers abducted in Niger Delta”,  June 3, 2006, Spero News 
June-04-06 Positive “Nigeria: All eight hostages freed”, June 4, 2006, Breakingnews.ie 
October-04-06 Violent D. Udoh, “Nigeria searches for missing soldiers”, October 6 2006, The Independent Online 
November-06-
06 
Kidnap K. Houreld, “Gunmen attack oil facility in Nigeria”, November 12 2006, The Independent Online 
November-20-
06 
Positive  “Nigerian hostage rescue effort leaves 1 foreign worker dead”, November 22, 2006, USA Today 
November-23-
06 
Positive S. Fletcher, “Nigerian strife raises crude prices”, November 27, 2006, Oil & Gas Journal 
December-26-
06 






O. Quist-Arcton, “Nigerian Election Results Hotly Disputed”, April 23, 2007, NPR 
April-23-07 Miscellaneous Neutral O. Quist-Arcton, “Nigerian Election Results Hotly Disputed”, April 23, 2007, NPR 
May-09-07 Kidnap T. Ashby, “Nigerian militants kidnap US workers”, May 9 2007, The Independent Online 




J. McBride, “Oil falls, Nigeria strike supports”, June 19, 2007,  Reuters 




A. Ekeinde, “Nigerian rebels end truce, others attack oil rig”, July 4, 2007, Reuters 
July-05-07 Kidnap E. Henry, “Nigeria kidnap girl 'could be freed today', July 8, 2007, The Telegraph 
July-05-07 Kidnap “Waiting game for Nigeria kidnap victims' families”, July 5, 2007, New Zealand Herald 






















T. Ahemba, “Strike, rebel attacks hit Nigerian oil output”, April 25, 2008, Reuters 
May-02-08 Positive I. Kao, “Exxon resumes 300,000 bpd Nigeria oil production”, May 2, 2008, Reuters 
May-03-08 Violent D. Flynn, “Shell shuts more Nigerian oil after rebel attack”, May 3, 2008, Reuters 
June-19-08 Violent “Shell shuts down Nigerian oilfield after attack”, June 19, 2008, USA Today  
June-21-08 Violent “Nigeria oil pipeline 'attacked'”, June 21, 2008, BBC News 










“Unrest in Nigeria's oil heartland”, May 15, 2009, Reuters 
May-17-09 Positive N. Tattersall, “Nigeria militants say blow up two oil, gas pipelines”, May 17, 2009,  Reuters 
May-26-09 Violent O.Onabu, S. Ojeifo, and E. Alike, “Militants Blow Up Chevron Pipeline”, May 26, 2009, This Day 
June-09-09 Positive “Nigeria victims hail $19m Shell payout”, June 10, 2009, news.com.au 
June-10-09 Violent “Chevron confirms fire at Nigeria oil facility”, June 10, 2009, The Independent Online 
June-21-09 Violent R. Fabi, “Nigerian rebels say they attacked Shell pipeline”, June 25, 2009, Reuters 
July-08-09 Violent “Nigerian militants claim oil pipeline sabotage”, July 8, 2009, CNN 
July-10-09 Violent “Nigerian rebels blow up Chevron pipeline”, July 11, 2009, Channel News Asia 
July-14-09 Violent “Atlas Cove - MEND Cripples Fuel Supply Chain”, July 14, 2009, Vanguard 
July-15-09 Positive M. Faul, “Analysis: Nigeria oil truce won't end conflict”, July 15, 2009, Omaha World Herald 








“Nigeria militants end ceasefire”, October 16, 2009, BBC News 
October-25-09 Positive D. Mbachu, “Nigeria Delta Truce Depends on Progress in Talks”, October 27, 2009, Bloomberg 
December-19-
09 




“Nigeria’s MEND call off unilateral truce”, January 30, 2010, Zeenews.com 
November-08-
10 
Kidnap N. Tattersall, “Gunmen kidnap five from Afren oil rig in Nigeria”, November 8, 2010, Reuters 
December-05-
10 








NYSE Shell Chevron 













































-0.00298 0.00082 -0.00159 0.00351 -0.00223 -0.00665 -0.01791 -0.01314 0.02933 -0.00993 -0.01867 0.0024 -0.01732 0.0234 -0.00923 
June-02-06 Kidnap 
-0.03086 -0.0304 0.00466 -0.01796 -0.00741 -0.04114 -0.0427 0.00793 -0.01514 -0.01346 -0.03353 -0.005 0.01331 -0.02305 -0.00661 
June-04-06 Positive 
































0.00247 0.01099 -0.00118 -0.00228 0.01036 0.00296 0.03709 0.00273 -0.0054 0.01499 -0.01743 -0.01538 -0.01403 -0.00801 0.01314 
May-09-07 Kidnap 
-0.01454 -0.01359 0.00186 -0.0172 0.00776 -0.04739 -0.00572 -0.01778 -0.02846 0.00866 -0.01414 -0.01942 -0.00839 -0.0237 0.01902 
May-25-07 Kidnap 




-0.03078 -0.02352 -0.00542 -0.01271 0.00493 -0.01182 0.02594 -0.00418 -0.00629 0.0177 -0.01415 0.00312 -0.00297 -0.02972 0.02145 
June-23-07 Positive 




-0.00526 0.01482 0.00355 -9.1E-05 0.0043 -0.00738 -0.0255 0.01051 -0.01501 0.0187 0.04168 0.0629 0.01322 0.00191 0.01219 
July-05-07 Kidnap 
-0.00437 0.00576 -0.00016 0.00413 0.00222 -0.02154 -0.04476 -0.01578 0.01793 0.00073 0.04482 0.06531 0.00159 0.01146 0.01956 
July-05-07 Kidnap 




























0.01850 0.02367 0.00886 0.00104 -0.00533 0.05471 0.06052 0.02054 -0.00787 0.04902 0.02525 0.05095 0.00289 -0.00325 0.02397 
May-02-08 Positive 
-0.01045 -0.00312 0.00549 -0.00554 0.005 -0.01319 -0.03671 0.00728 -0.00256 0.00465 0.01572 0.01705 0.00212 0.00026 0.01119 
May-03-08 
Violent -0.01045 -0.00312 0.00549 -0.00554 0.005 -0.01319 -0.03671 0.00728 -0.00256 0.00465 0.01572 0.01705 0.00212 0.00026 0.01119 
June-19-08 
Violent -0.02239 -0.06467 -0.00015 -0.01791 0.00205 -0.01360 -0.02604 -0.01365 -0.01432 0.01152 -0.00769 -0.03569 -0.02595 -0.00412 0.02348 
June-21-08 
Violent -0.04517 -0.06081 -0.01789 0.00299 -0.01267 -0.00955 -0.02173 -0.0157 0.01014 -0.00788 -0.00918 -0.01186 -0.00551 0.0225 -0.00727 
June-22-08 Positive 








-0.01899 -0.01066 -0.01826 0.02904 -0.00411 0.03493 0.06898 -0.01154 0.03355 0.00071 -0.05008 -0.01773 -0.02905 0.00204 -0.00259 
May-17-09 Positive 




0.03202 -0.00756 0.01076 -0.01948 0.00738 0.07386 0.0304 0.02805 -0.02942 0.02713 0.07055 0.07451 0.0186 -0.01851 0.01887 
June-09-09 Positive 
-0.03107 -0.08456 0.00271 -0.00601 0.00891 -0.07453 -0.1495 0.0011 0.00676 -0.00454 0.02810 -0.04166 0.01025 0.00092 0.02541 
June-10-09 
Violent -0.05051 -0.0994 -0.00631 0.00854 -0.0077 -0.09408 -0.15889 0.00536 -0.00594 -0.02689 -0.00338 -0.05834 0.00063 0.02416 0.01091 
June-21-09 
Violent -0.02901 -0.07036 0.00079 -0.03911 -0.00623 -0.06512 -0.14082 0.01044 -0.04898 0.00318 -0.03232 -0.07764 -0.00751 -0.03513 0.00093 
July-08-09 
Violent 0.03022 0.09411 -0.00253 0.00497 -0.00484 0.00599 0.06829 -0.00244 0.00627 -0.00623 0.01015 0.06738 0.00225 0.00624 -0.02566 
July-10-09 




0.06421 0.09604 0.01093 0.03126 0.00768 0.07400 0.09619 0.0055 0.03953 0.01502 0.04947 0.09916 0.00867 0.02441 0.00466 
July-15-09 Positive 
0.05689 0.08517 0.03132 0.00753 -0.00096 0.06946 0.09485 0.04039 0.01589 -0.00789 0.04880 0.07997 0.02456 0.00372 0.00319 
July-29-09 Violent 











































Exxon Total BP 













































-0.02358 -0.01813 -0.00691 0.01589 -0.01008 -0.01495 -0.02085 -0.01003 0.01963 -0.00227 -0.03303 -0.02232 -0.01267 0.01745 -0.00761 
June-02-06 Kidnap 
-0.02146 -0.02480 0.00967 -0.02547 0.00666 -0.06135 -0.05548 0.00801 -0.01818 -0.01568 -0.04137 -0.05697 0.01154 -0.01561 -0.01073 
June-04-06 Positive 
































0.00246 -0.00057 -0.00810 -0.00831 0.01572 0.00740 0.02030 -0.00425 -0.00196 0.01772 -0.02042 -0.01596 -0.00039 -0.01528 0.01689 
May-09-07 Kidnap 
-0.02531 -0.02832 -0.00414 -0.02892 0.01855 -0.03260 -0.02832 -0.00007 -0.01763 0.00904 -0.05295 -0.04370 -0.01521 -0.02761 0.00485 
May-25-07 Kidnap 




-0.05486 -0.03546 -0.00783 -0.03698 0.01606 -0.01447 0.03435 0.00201 -0.00923 0.00889 0.01597 0.06694 0.00725 -0.01156 0.00584 
June-23-07 Positive 




0.01543 0.04131 0.00549 -0.00317 0.01439 0.00152 0.00956 -0.00170 -0.00547 0.02608 0.00322 0.00649 0.00268 -0.00842 0.00777 
July-05-07 Kidnap 
0.01650 0.05500 -0.00357 0.01417 0.01011 0.00371 -0.00082 -0.00584 0.02567 0.00765 0.00425 0.00910 -0.00849 0.00741 0.00743 
July-05-07 Kidnap 




























-0.03349 -0.03239 -0.00180 -0.00119 -0.00743 0.01824 0.01511 0.00925 -0.00372 0.01699 0.05970 0.07195 0.02032 -0.00406 0.04650 
May-02-08 Positive 
-0.01632 -0.01950 -0.00468 -0.00541 0.00258 -0.01935 -0.01001 0.00755 -0.00340 0.00802 -0.00113 -0.00550 0.00190 0.00104 0.00269 
May-03-08 
Violent -0.01632 -0.01950 -0.00468 -0.00541 0.00258 -0.01935 -0.01001 0.00755 -0.00340 0.00802 -0.00113 -0.00550 0.00190 0.00104 0.00269 
June-19-08 
Violent 0.01019 0.02082 -0.02070 -0.00761 0.03539 0.02210 0.00309 -0.00505 0.00399 0.02511 0.00366 -0.04435 -0.01678 -0.00114 0.01068 
June-21-08 
Violent 0.01315 0.04079 -0.00913 0.03423 -0.00777 0.01396 -0.00700 0.00336 0.02410 -0.01126 0.00137 -0.02941 -0.00248 0.00998 -0.01319 
June-22-08 Positive 








-0.02102 -0.00795 -0.00945 0.01923 0.00015 0.02157 0.06110 -0.01355 0.04157 -0.00125 0.00586 0.03003 -0.01689 0.03194 -0.00729 
May-17-09 Positive 




0.03880 0.05652 0.01373 -0.02321 0.01311 0.05902 0.00767 0.01481 -0.02250 0.01460 0.05972 0.02100 0.01459 -0.01668 0.01003 
June-09-09 Positive 
-0.00630 -0.06168 -0.00094 0.00947 0.00259 -0.06939 -0.12864 0.00664 -0.00466 -0.00016 -0.06008 -0.14425 0.00563 -0.00317 -0.00529 
June-10-09 
Violent -0.02460 -0.06508 0.00900 0.00192 -0.00449 -0.09195 -0.13353 -0.00504 -0.00155 -0.02676 -0.08564 -0.15814 -0.00349 -0.00615 -0.02668 
June-21-09 
Violent -0.03865 -0.07465 -0.00905 -0.03398 -0.00200 -0.03658 -0.08332 -0.00250 -0.04161 0.01254 -0.04301 -0.08620 0.01563 -0.04773 -0.00208 
July-08-09 
Violent -0.00281 0.06269 -0.00422 -0.00323 -0.01260 0.02576 0.12809 0.00027 0.01293 -0.01867 0.02335 0.10066 -0.00062 0.00556 -0.00721 
July-10-09 




0.04727 0.10257 0.00744 0.03346 -0.00018 0.07289 0.09976 -0.00614 0.03819 0.01416 0.07810 0.09493 0.00273 0.04107 0.01102 
July-15-09 Positive 
0.06239 0.08313 0.03340 -0.00090 0.00075 0.09252 0.08899 0.03750 0.01386 0.00473 0.07163 0.06930 0.04096 0.01056 -0.00513 
July-29-09 Violent 




































Table A.5. All abnormal returns data with corresponding dummy variables as inputted into Stata for analysis 
CAR5 CAR10 AR0 AR1 AR2 NYSE BP ctrl Shell Chevron Exxon Total SA Violent Kidnap Positive misc neut misc bad (misc negative) Shell neg Chev neg Shell pos Event ID 
-0.00157 -0.00373 0.00241 -0.00724 0.00889 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
-0.00157 -0.00373 0.00241 -0.00724 0.00889 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
0.00066 0.02165 0.00904 0.00691 -0.01207 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
-0.03559 -0.07753 0.01555 0.00737 -0.01765 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 
-0.03276 -0.02993 -0.00072 -0.00622 -0.01346 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 
-0.03276 -0.02993 -0.00072 -0.00622 -0.01346 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 
0.00051 0.03443 0.02504 -0.00591 0.00542 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 7 
0.03642 0.01905 0.00010 0.01237 0.00697 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 
0.04786 0.01842 0.01255 0.00715 0.01534 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 9 
-0.02830 0.02422 -0.01186 -0.01114 -0.00632 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
-0.00665 -0.01791 -0.01314 0.02933 -0.00993 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 11 
-0.04115 -0.04270 0.00793 -0.01514 -0.01346 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 
-0.04115 -0.04270 0.00793 -0.01514 -0.01346 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 13 
0.01831 0.06116 0.01338 -0.00126 -0.00381 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
0.03558 0.01032 0.01151 0.00069 0.01066 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
-0.02208 -0.03606 -0.01545 0.00609 -0.00426 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 16 
-0.01149 -0.02380 -0.00425 -0.00245 -0.00607 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 17 
0.01004 -0.05539 0.00734 0.01553 -0.00655 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 
0.03256 0.04825 0.01910 0.00679 0.00761 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 19 
0.00297 0.03709 0.00273 -0.00540 0.01499 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 20 
-0.04739 -0.00572 -0.01778 -0.02846 0.00866 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 21 
0.00869 0.02428 0.00648 -0.01686 0.00320 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 
-0.01183 0.02594 -0.00418 -0.00629 0.01770 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 23 
-0.01136 0.03112 -0.01508 -0.00412 -0.00857 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 24 
-0.00738 -0.02550 0.01051 -0.01501 0.01870 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 25 
-0.02154 -0.04476 -0.01578 0.01793 0.00073 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 
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-0.02154 -0.04476 -0.01578 0.01793 0.00073 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 
0.00807 0.03340 -0.00052 -0.01644 0.02083 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 28 
-0.04266 -0.09883 -0.03367 0.00907 -0.01202 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 29 
0.00453 -0.00671 -0.01018 -0.00415 0.01698 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 30 
0.01346 -0.06918 0.02039 -0.01532 0.02493 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 31 
0.00201 0.05414 -0.00922 0.02116 -0.02096 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 32 
0.05471 0.06052 0.02054 -0.00787 0.04902 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 
-0.01319 -0.03671 0.00728 -0.00256 0.00465 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 34 
-0.01319 -0.03671 0.00728 -0.00256 0.00465 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 35 
-0.01361 -0.02604 -0.01365 -0.01432 0.01152 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 36 
-0.00956 -0.02173 -0.01570 0.01014 -0.00788 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 37 
-0.00956 -0.02173 -0.01570 0.01014 -0.00788 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 38 
0.02370 0.04562 -0.00669 -0.00024 -0.00875 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 39 
0.03493 0.06898 -0.01154 0.03355 0.00071 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 40 
0.03493 0.06898 -0.01154 0.03355 0.00071 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 41 
0.07387 0.03040 0.02805 -0.02942 0.02713 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 42 
-0.07454 -0.14950 0.00110 0.00676 -0.00454 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 43 
-0.09409 -0.15889 0.00536 -0.00594 -0.02689 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 44 
-0.06513 -0.14082 0.01044 -0.04898 0.00318 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 45 
0.00599 0.06829 -0.00244 0.00627 -0.00623 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 46 
0.06242 0.08100 -0.00505 0.00467 0.00611 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 47 
0.07400 0.09619 0.00550 0.03953 0.01502 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 48 
0.06947 0.09485 0.04039 0.01589 -0.00789 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 49 
0.03222 0.00938 0.00387 0.00197 0.00235 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 50 
-0.00185 0.05548 -0.01051 0.00390 0.00062 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 51 
0.04379 0.02352 0.00957 0.01285 0.01632 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 52 
-0.02918 -0.05440 -0.01527 -0.00642 0.01655 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 53 
0.05348 0.08857 -0.00401 0.02283 0.01800 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 54 
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-0.03656 -0.01367 -0.01812 0.02182 0.01513 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 55 
-0.04229 -0.06626 -0.01447 -0.02429 0.00717 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 
0.00059 0.00401 0.00212 -0.00309 0.00258 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 
0.02714 0.03267 0.01002 0.00039 0.00774 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
0.02714 0.03267 0.01002 0.00039 0.00774 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
0.01998 0.00707 0.00774 0.02475 -0.01563 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
-0.05930 -0.08570 0.00357 -0.02444 -0.01401 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 
0.01749 -0.00055 0.01425 0.01119 -0.01260 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 
0.01749 -0.00055 0.01425 0.01119 -0.01260 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 
-0.01793 0.00214 0.01381 -0.00279 -0.00034 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 7 
0.02981 0.03373 -0.01136 -0.00531 0.02114 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 
0.06814 0.05515 -0.00537 0.02197 0.02263 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 9 
-0.00399 0.04494 -0.00661 -0.00447 -0.00009 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
-0.01868 0.00240 -0.01732 0.02340 -0.00923 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 11 
-0.03354 -0.00500 0.01331 -0.02305 -0.00661 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 
-0.03354 -0.00500 0.01331 -0.02305 -0.00661 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 13 
0.02751 0.05702 0.01455 0.00497 -0.00097 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
-0.00414 -0.02286 0.00996 -0.01549 0.00619 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
-0.02105 0.02924 -0.00136 0.01155 -0.01221 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 16 
-0.00240 0.01784 -0.01177 -0.01332 -0.00425 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 17 
-0.03887 -0.07350 0.00207 0.00944 0.00037 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 
-0.00924 0.00410 -0.00294 0.01003 0.00029 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 19 
-0.01743 -0.01538 -0.01403 -0.00801 0.01314 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 20 
-0.01414 -0.01942 -0.00839 -0.02370 0.01902 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 21 
0.01467 -0.01679 0.01200 -0.00850 0.01657 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 
-0.01415 0.00312 -0.00297 -0.02972 0.02145 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 23 
0.00976 0.04474 -0.01704 0.01633 -0.00436 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 24 
0.04169 0.06290 0.01322 0.00191 0.01219 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 25 
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0.04483 0.06531 0.00159 0.01146 0.01956 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 
0.04483 0.06531 0.00159 0.01146 0.01956 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 
-0.03278 -0.04188 0.00024 -0.01210 0.00833 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 28 
-0.04398 -0.06013 -0.02720 -0.00608 -0.00021 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 29 
0.04891 0.07446 0.00330 -0.00560 0.02706 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 30 
-0.01432 -0.08652 0.01125 -0.01395 -0.01412 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 31 
-0.00799 0.01959 0.01319 0.00355 -0.02317 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 32 
0.02525 0.05095 0.00289 -0.00325 0.02397 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 
0.01573 0.01705 0.00212 0.00026 0.01119 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 34 
0.01573 0.01705 0.00212 0.00026 0.01119 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 35 
-0.00770 -0.03569 -0.02595 -0.00412 0.02348 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 36 
-0.00919 -0.01186 -0.00551 0.02250 -0.00727 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 37 
-0.00919 -0.01186 -0.00551 0.02250 -0.00727 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 38 
-0.05001 -0.07152 -0.01638 -0.00313 -0.02966 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 39 
-0.05009 -0.01773 -0.02905 0.00204 -0.00259 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 40 
-0.05009 -0.01773 -0.02905 0.00204 -0.00259 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 41 
0.07055 0.07451 0.01860 -0.01851 0.01887 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 42 
0.02810 -0.04166 0.01025 0.00092 0.02541 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 43 
-0.00338 -0.05834 0.00063 0.02416 0.01091 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 44 
-0.03233 -0.07764 -0.00751 -0.03513 0.00093 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 45 
0.01016 0.06738 0.00225 0.00624 -0.02566 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 46 
0.03406 0.08673 -0.02573 0.01856 0.00987 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 47 
0.04948 0.09916 0.00867 0.02441 0.00466 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 48 
0.04881 0.07997 0.02456 0.00372 0.00319 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 49 
0.04066 0.01440 -0.01583 0.01066 0.02816 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 50 
0.04315 0.07753 -0.00207 0.01241 0.01697 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 51 
0.01942 0.00484 0.01625 0.00120 0.01101 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 52 
0.00233 -0.01309 -0.00916 -0.01716 0.01384 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 53 
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0.00600 0.02498 0.00113 0.00708 -0.00056 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 54 
-0.02571 -0.02131 -0.01540 0.02050 0.01172 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 55 
-0.00614 -0.03510 -0.00448 -0.01673 0.01691 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 
0.02427 0.05154 0.00438 0.00049 0.01566 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 
0.01400 0.00660 0.00694 -0.01051 0.02239 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
0.01400 0.00660 0.00694 -0.01051 0.02239 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
0.01506 0.02824 0.02239 0.00914 -0.01389 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
-0.00841 -0.04960 0.02771 -0.00785 -0.01473 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 
-0.00879 -0.01090 0.00271 0.00092 -0.01050 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 
-0.00879 -0.01090 0.00271 0.00092 -0.01050 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 
-0.00158 0.00387 0.01424 0.00722 0.00004 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 7 
0.02072 0.01933 -0.01360 0.00470 0.00740 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 
0.04627 0.04025 0.00453 0.00741 0.01973 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 9 
-0.00286 -0.00127 -0.00883 -0.00587 0.00173 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
-0.02358 -0.01813 -0.00691 0.01589 -0.01008 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 11 
-0.02146 -0.02480 0.00967 -0.02547 0.00666 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 
-0.02146 -0.02480 0.00967 -0.02547 0.00666 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 13 
0.03741 0.08268 0.02043 0.01210 0.00506 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
0.01861 -0.01194 0.00809 -0.00804 0.01962 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
-0.02490 0.02814 -0.01246 0.01077 -0.01011 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 16 
0.01874 0.00489 -0.01001 -0.01026 -0.00223 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 17 
-0.02832 -0.07934 0.00632 0.00932 0.00264 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 
0.00070 0.04054 0.00024 0.00968 0.00293 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 19 
0.00246 -0.00057 -0.00810 -0.00831 0.01572 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 20 
-0.02531 -0.02832 -0.00414 -0.02892 0.01855 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 21 
0.01210 -0.01689 0.01284 -0.01352 0.01459 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 
-0.05486 -0.03546 -0.00783 -0.03698 0.01606 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 23 
-0.01286 0.01562 -0.02216 -0.00222 -0.00772 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 24 
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0.01543 0.04131 0.00549 -0.00317 0.01439 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 25 
0.01650 0.05500 -0.00357 0.01417 0.01011 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 
0.01650 0.05500 -0.00357 0.01417 0.01011 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 
0.00373 0.01376 0.00173 -0.01026 0.01883 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 28 
-0.05981 -0.07753 -0.03969 -0.00755 -0.00482 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 29 
0.03883 0.04820 -0.00098 -0.00593 0.02292 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 30 
-0.02751 -0.08810 0.00187 -0.01926 -0.01089 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 31 
-0.02081 -0.05373 0.00100 -0.00193 -0.01757 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 32 
-0.03349 -0.03239 -0.00180 -0.00119 -0.00743 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 
-0.01632 -0.01950 -0.00468 -0.00541 0.00258 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 34 
-0.01632 -0.01950 -0.00468 -0.00541 0.00258 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 35 
0.01019 0.02082 -0.02070 -0.00761 0.03539 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 36 
0.01315 0.04079 -0.00913 0.03423 -0.00777 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 37 
0.01315 0.04079 -0.00913 0.03423 -0.00777 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 38 
0.00103 -0.02580 -0.01387 0.00130 -0.00836 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 39 
-0.02102 -0.00795 -0.00945 0.01923 0.00015 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 40 
-0.02102 -0.00795 -0.00945 0.01923 0.00015 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 41 
0.03880 0.05652 0.01373 -0.02321 0.01311 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 42 
-0.00630 -0.06168 -0.00094 0.00947 0.00259 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 43 
-0.02460 -0.06508 0.00900 0.00192 -0.00449 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 44 
-0.03865 -0.07465 -0.00905 -0.03398 -0.00200 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 45 
-0.00281 0.06269 -0.00422 -0.00323 -0.01260 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 46 
0.03940 0.08852 -0.01264 0.00955 0.00816 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 47 
0.04727 0.10257 0.00744 0.03346 -0.00018 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 48 
0.06239 0.08313 0.03340 -0.00090 0.00075 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 49 
-0.00858 -0.03389 -0.00446 -0.00823 -0.00273 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 50 
0.02153 0.05934 -0.00030 0.00557 0.00274 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 51 
0.02341 0.03403 0.01594 0.00286 0.00746 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 52 
69 
 
-0.00500 -0.02324 -0.01140 -0.00431 0.02323 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 53 
0.00716 0.01544 0.00007 0.00424 0.00109 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 54 
0.01156 0.03520 -0.00513 0.03025 0.01482 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 55 
-0.00014 -0.02048 0.00174 0.00153 0.00425 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 
-0.00854 -0.02163 -0.00732 -0.00108 -0.00116 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 
0.00222 -0.00069 0.00745 -0.00623 0.01405 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
0.00222 -0.00069 0.00745 -0.00623 0.01405 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
0.00477 0.02617 0.01468 0.00562 -0.01752 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
-0.04046 -0.08636 0.00649 -0.00229 -0.01969 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 
-0.00876 -0.02731 0.01155 -0.00517 -0.01000 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 
-0.00876 -0.02731 0.01155 -0.00517 -0.01000 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 
-0.01344 0.02497 0.00633 0.00348 -0.00724 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 7 
0.04878 0.03856 0.00018 0.00938 0.01478 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 
0.05823 0.04225 0.00957 0.01477 0.01876 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 9 
-0.01037 0.04139 -0.00245 -0.00980 -0.00884 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
-0.01495 -0.02085 -0.01003 0.01963 -0.00227 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 11 
-0.06135 -0.05548 0.00801 -0.01818 -0.01568 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 
-0.06135 -0.05548 0.00801 -0.01818 -0.01568 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 13 
0.02424 0.04949 0.01744 0.00012 -0.00063 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
0.04790 0.01188 0.02006 -0.00054 0.00885 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
-0.01410 -0.02024 -0.00544 0.00988 -0.00710 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 16 
0.00193 -0.02679 -0.00732 -0.00186 -0.00961 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 17 
-0.00064 -0.07519 0.00463 0.01737 -0.00632 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 
0.00683 0.02421 0.00869 0.00298 0.00598 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 19 
0.00740 0.02030 -0.00425 -0.00196 0.01772 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 20 
-0.03260 -0.02832 -0.00007 -0.01763 0.00904 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 21 
0.00286 -0.02965 0.01134 -0.01553 0.00173 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 
-0.01447 0.03435 0.00201 -0.00923 0.00889 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 23 
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0.00395 0.06031 -0.00983 -0.00467 -0.00792 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 24 
0.00152 0.00956 -0.00170 -0.00547 0.02608 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 25 
0.00371 -0.00082 -0.00584 0.02567 0.00765 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 
0.00371 -0.00082 -0.00584 0.02567 0.00765 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 
-0.01508 0.00353 -0.00353 -0.01543 0.01271 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 28 
0.02069 -0.03505 -0.04170 0.02383 -0.00643 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 29 
0.02000 -0.02286 -0.00287 -0.00095 0.01756 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 30 
0.03218 -0.04746 0.02161 -0.01228 0.02390 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 31 
-0.01206 0.00621 0.00069 0.00756 -0.02453 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 32 
0.01824 0.01511 0.00925 -0.00372 0.01699 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 
-0.01935 -0.01001 0.00755 -0.00340 0.00802 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 34 
-0.01935 -0.01001 0.00755 -0.00340 0.00802 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 35 
0.02210 0.00309 -0.00505 0.00399 0.02511 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 36 
0.01396 -0.00700 0.00336 0.02410 -0.01126 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 37 
0.01396 -0.00700 0.00336 0.02410 -0.01126 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 38 
-0.02007 -0.02456 -0.01733 -0.03133 -0.01261 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 39 
0.02157 0.06110 -0.01355 0.04157 -0.00125 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 40 
0.02157 0.06110 -0.01355 0.04157 -0.00125 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 41 
0.05902 0.00767 0.01481 -0.02250 0.01460 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 42 
-0.06939 -0.12864 0.00664 -0.00466 -0.00016 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 43 
-0.09195 -0.13353 -0.00504 -0.00155 -0.02676 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 44 
-0.03658 -0.08332 -0.00250 -0.04161 0.01254 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 45 
0.02576 0.12809 0.00027 0.01293 -0.01867 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 46 
0.06654 0.12732 -0.01895 0.03522 -0.00442 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 47 
0.07289 0.09976 -0.00614 0.03819 0.01416 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 48 
0.09252 0.08899 0.03750 0.01386 0.00473 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 49 
0.00030 -0.02619 -0.01264 0.01349 -0.00576 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 50 
0.01098 0.04406 -0.00834 0.00631 0.00333 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 51 
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0.00721 -0.04230 0.00273 0.00145 0.00792 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 52 
-0.03006 -0.03512 -0.01008 -0.02239 0.00527 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 53 
0.04585 0.06554 -0.01397 0.02598 0.01606 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 54 
-0.01904 -0.01014 -0.00743 0.02447 0.00829 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 55 
-0.06781 -0.09159 -0.00929 -0.03319 -0.00283 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 
0.03630 0.05198 0.01921 0.00308 0.00403 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 
-0.01332 -0.01524 0.00509 -0.00777 0.00086 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
-0.01332 -0.01524 0.00509 -0.00777 0.00086 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
-0.01869 0.00028 0.00095 -0.00563 -0.00575 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
-0.01669 -0.02587 0.00108 -0.00215 -0.00041 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 
0.00192 -0.00500 -0.00028 -0.00140 0.00471 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 
0.00192 -0.00500 -0.00028 -0.00140 0.00471 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 
-0.01057 0.00664 0.00604 -0.00109 -0.00140 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 7 
0.02281 0.02169 -0.00260 0.00720 0.00484 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 
0.02798 0.02268 0.00706 0.00453 0.01005 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 9 
-0.00498 -0.00456 0.00156 -0.00331 -0.00610 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
-0.00298 0.00082 -0.00159 0.00351 -0.00223 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 11 
-0.03087 -0.03040 0.00466 -0.01796 -0.00741 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 
-0.03087 -0.03040 0.00466 -0.01796 -0.00741 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 13 
0.00996 0.01623 0.00897 0.00415 -0.00478 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
0.00382 0.00355 0.01089 0.00158 -0.00163 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
-0.01559 -0.00184 -0.00170 0.00231 0.00220 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 16 
-0.00407 0.00179 0.00244 -0.00211 -0.01583 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 17 
0.00107 -0.01836 0.00131 0.01087 -0.00466 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 
0.01703 0.03325 0.00467 0.01222 0.00052 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 19 
0.00247 0.01099 -0.00118 -0.00228 0.01036 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 20 
-0.01454 -0.01359 0.00186 -0.01720 0.00776 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 21 
0.01470 -0.01472 0.00493 0.00076 0.00322 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 
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-0.03078 -0.02352 -0.00542 -0.01271 0.00493 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 23 
-0.01095 -0.00073 -0.00997 -0.00704 -0.00325 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 24 
-0.00527 0.01482 0.00355 -0.00009 0.00430 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 25 
-0.00437 0.00576 -0.00016 0.00413 0.00222 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 
-0.00437 0.00576 -0.00016 0.00413 0.00222 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 
0.00222 -0.01408 0.00846 -0.00737 0.00712 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 28 
-0.04878 -0.04783 -0.02698 0.00360 -0.01143 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 29 
0.02844 0.00810 -0.00165 -0.00411 0.01674 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 30 
-0.02034 -0.04513 0.00376 -0.02173 0.00312 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 31 
0.00512 0.01677 -0.01001 0.00271 0.00276 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 32 
0.01850 0.02367 0.00886 0.00104 -0.00533 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 
-0.01046 -0.00312 0.00549 -0.00554 0.00500 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 34 
-0.01046 -0.00312 0.00549 -0.00554 0.00500 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 35 
-0.02239 -0.06467 -0.00015 -0.01791 0.00205 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 36 
-0.04518 -0.06081 -0.01789 0.00299 -0.01267 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 37 
-0.04518 -0.06081 -0.01789 0.00299 -0.01267 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 38 
-0.01676 -0.04062 -0.03796 0.01225 -0.01709 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 39 
-0.01899 -0.01066 -0.01826 0.02904 -0.00411 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 40 
-0.01899 -0.01066 -0.01826 0.02904 -0.00411 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 41 
0.03203 -0.00756 0.01076 -0.01948 0.00738 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 42 
-0.03108 -0.08456 0.00271 -0.00601 0.00891 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 43 
-0.05052 -0.09940 -0.00631 0.00854 -0.00770 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 44 
-0.02902 -0.07036 0.00079 -0.03911 -0.00623 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 45 
0.03022 0.09411 -0.00253 0.00497 -0.00484 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 46 
0.06241 0.09947 -0.00652 0.01893 0.01085 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 47 
0.06422 0.09604 0.01093 0.03126 0.00768 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 48 
0.05689 0.08517 0.03132 0.00753 -0.00096 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 49 
0.04173 0.03130 -0.00641 0.01553 0.00851 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 50 
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0.00972 0.01850 -0.00074 0.00976 0.00159 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 51 
-0.01353 -0.06478 0.00197 -0.01018 0.01178 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 52 
-0.03822 -0.04585 -0.01708 -0.01636 -0.00598 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 53 
0.02045 0.03087 0.00255 0.00855 0.00465 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 54 
-0.03021 -0.01778 -0.01697 0.01906 0.01219 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 55 
-0.02771 -0.03231 -0.00256 -0.00894 0.00154 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 
-0.00084 0.00517 0.00376 -0.00246 0.00149 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 
0.02078 0.03154 -0.00387 0.00148 0.02628 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
0.02078 0.03154 -0.00387 0.00148 0.02628 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
0.03413 0.04868 0.02649 0.00939 -0.01276 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
-0.03688 -0.07199 0.01549 -0.00124 -0.01871 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 
-0.02388 -0.04225 -0.00100 0.00770 -0.02254 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 
-0.02388 -0.04225 -0.00100 0.00770 -0.02254 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 
-0.01295 0.01669 0.00989 -0.00479 0.00203 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 7 
0.05842 0.04053 -0.00147 0.00632 0.01781 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 
0.06058 0.04117 0.00656 0.01778 0.01426 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 9 
-0.01080 0.01689 -0.00344 -0.00930 -0.00542 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
-0.03303 -0.02232 -0.01267 0.01745 -0.00761 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 11 
-0.04137 -0.05697 0.01154 -0.01561 -0.01073 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 
-0.04137 -0.05697 0.01154 -0.01561 -0.01073 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 13 
0.02176 0.08316 0.02280 -0.00229 -0.00008 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 
0.00722 -0.03158 0.01252 -0.00473 0.00781 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
-0.00701 0.00224 -0.00381 0.01036 -0.00752 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 16 
0.01018 0.00290 -0.00709 -0.00274 -0.00233 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 17 
-0.00941 -0.07770 0.00213 0.00909 -0.00205 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 
0.01271 -0.00191 0.01377 0.00374 0.00257 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 19 
-0.02042 -0.01596 -0.00039 -0.01528 0.01689 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 20 
-0.05295 -0.04370 -0.01521 -0.02761 0.00485 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 21 
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0.00198 -0.01012 0.00721 -0.00892 0.00364 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 
0.01597 0.06694 0.00725 -0.01156 0.00584 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 23 
0.03847 0.06487 0.00800 0.00496 0.00448 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 24 
0.00322 0.00649 0.00268 -0.00842 0.00777 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 25 
0.00425 0.00910 -0.00849 0.00741 0.00743 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 
0.00425 0.00910 -0.00849 0.00741 0.00743 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 
0.02333 0.06856 0.01188 -0.01114 0.01910 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 28 
-0.01872 -0.08582 -0.02342 0.02370 0.00207 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 29 
0.03493 0.01682 0.00801 -0.01425 0.01814 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 30 
-0.00925 -0.07850 0.02161 -0.01238 0.02044 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 31 
0.01211 0.06735 0.00676 0.00563 -0.01875 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 32 
0.05970 0.07195 0.02032 -0.00406 0.04650 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 
-0.00113 -0.00550 0.00190 0.00104 0.00269 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 34 
-0.00113 -0.00550 0.00190 0.00104 0.00269 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 35 
0.00366 -0.04435 -0.01678 -0.00114 0.01068 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 36 
0.00137 -0.02941 -0.00248 0.00998 -0.01319 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 37 
0.00137 -0.02941 -0.00248 0.00998 -0.01319 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 38 
-0.02892 -0.02193 -0.04232 0.00308 -0.01567 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 39 
0.00586 0.03003 -0.01689 0.03194 -0.00729 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 40 
0.00586 0.03003 -0.01689 0.03194 -0.00729 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 41 
0.05972 0.02100 0.01459 -0.01668 0.01003 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 42 
-0.06008 -0.14425 0.00563 -0.00317 -0.00529 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 43 
-0.08564 -0.15814 -0.00349 -0.00615 -0.02668 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 44 
-0.04301 -0.08620 0.01563 -0.04773 -0.00208 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 45 
0.02335 0.10066 -0.00062 0.00556 -0.00721 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 46 
0.06977 0.10273 -0.00803 0.02105 0.00333 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 47 
0.07810 0.09493 0.00273 0.04107 0.01102 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 48 
0.07163 0.06930 0.04096 0.01056 -0.00513 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 49 
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0.04387 0.03625 -0.00460 0.00521 0.00541 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 50 
-0.00451 0.05346 -0.00671 0.00846 -0.01085 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 51 
0.05026 0.05686 0.02034 0.00407 0.02511 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 52 
0.02718 0.02829 -0.02211 0.00129 0.04161 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 53 
0.03588 0.04684 0.00401 0.01705 0.00320 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 54 
-0.07447 -0.05962 -0.02281 0.01885 -0.03263 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 55 
-0.02727 -0.05831 -0.01475 -0.00666 0.01037 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 
0.03328 0.05391 0.00363 0.03152 0.00138 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 
 
 
 
